The bottom line and the seminary by Osland, Asbjorn & Ankeny, M.
San Jose State University
SJSU ScholarWorks
Faculty Publications School of Management
Fall 10-1-2005
The bottom line and the seminary
Asbjorn Osland
San Jose State University, asbjorn.osland@sjsu.edu
M. Ankeny
Westminster College
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/org_mgmt_pub
Part of the Business Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Management at SJSU ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of SJSU ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@sjsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Asbjorn Osland and M. Ankeny. "The bottom line and the seminary" The Journal of Biblical Integration in Business: Business Cases with a
Christian Worldview (2005): 107-118.
106 The JBIB: Business Cases Fall 2005 
Case 11: The Bottom Line and the Seminary 
Asbjorn Osland
 
San Jose State University
 
Mark Ankeny
 
Westminster College
 
Challenges for the New Seminary Dean 
Dr. Gary Janzen, the new seminary dean, had recently come to 
Friends’ Northwest University (hereafter referred to as Friends’). 
He was to develop a strategy to make the seminary competitive 
locally (with its master’s degrees, certificate programs, and outreach), 
and competitive nationally (with its doctor of ministry degree program, 
which was based on a hybrid residential and online format). Janzen 
had a practical orientation, having served more than 25 years as a 
pastor. His terminal degree was a doctor of ministry – a professionally 
oriented doctorate, as opposed to the Ph.D.s held by researchers in 
seminaries. The newly arrived President Bill Duncan believed the 
seminary needed a practical leader. 
During the first three months of his tenure as the dean of 
the seminary, Janzen interviewed as many people as possible. 
The seminary had never even come close to breaking even; 
the financial reports showed yearly deficits of $150,000 to $300,000. 
The faculty morale of the seminary was extremely low; they felt 
beaten down, misunderstood, betrayed, assaulted, and unappreciated 
by the merger between the seminary and Friends’. When the two 
cultures had merged, the university culture had been imposed on the 
seminary. The seminary faculty had not had fair or good representation 
among the key administrators or board at the university level; there 
was no one who “championed” their cause, accomplishments, or 
mission. There was no clear identity or defined constituency. Janzen 
knew he had to act fast. He was concerned that President Duncan 
would be forced to pull the plug on the seminary; long-term deficits 
were unsustainable in the tuition-driven university. Although the 
M.B.A., counseling, and graduate degree programs in education 
subsidized the undergraduate program, Duncan and the university 
board wanted the other graduate programs (i.e., seminary and Psy.D.) 
to at least break even. He had instructed Janzen to resolve the financial 
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deficit and had told him he would support him if he could come up with 
a good plan. 
A central feature to Janzen’s plan was expanding the doctor of 
ministry options to include a program he and the faculty named 
“Leadership in Emerging Culture” (LEC). The American public had 
been moving away from established mainstream Protestant 
denominations to non-denominational churches or away from 
Christianity all together. Janzen and the faculty felt a strong sense of 
mission in attempting to be responsive to the spiritual needs of the 
changing American society. One way to do so was to train leaders in 
adapting Christ’s message of love and compassion to the needs of the 
emerging culture. Janzen was editing the LEC draft proposal to be 
presented to the faculty. Excerpts read as follows: 
• The LEC Doctor of Ministry (D.Min.) track “seeks to enable 
students to effectively lead in the emerging culture. Students in the 
program: establish a conceptual basis for ‘leadership in the emerging 
culture,’ develop their ministry vision and ‘voice’ in effective 
leadership, explore how one’s identification with the person of Christ 
impacts one’s self-perception as a leader, engage in and reflect on a 
cross-cultural experience in order to ‘think globally and act locally’ 
with regard to leadership issues in their particular ministry contexts, 
reflect on the essential intermingling of leadership and spiritual 
formation in corporate Christian contexts, and synthesize a coherent 
theology of leadership in the emerging culture that will serve to inform 
their practice of leadership.” 
• “The customized courses are designed to give students greater 
flexibility to pursue subjects of interest to them.” 
• The celebrity theologian’s “courses are characterized by directed 
reading and self-organizing interaction. … students explore various 
aspects of leadership in the emerging culture.” Courses normally 
include the reading, meeting weekly in an asynchronous chat forum 
to discuss the assigned course materials, and meeting once a week for 
synchronous chat. The celebrity theologian facilitates the discussion. 
Students meet from time to time with the celebrity theologian. 
This would be a new D.Min. track that would be responsive to 
changing societal needs. Janzen knew that pastors were searching for 
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professional, cognitive, psychological, and spiritual renewal, and some 
sought to meet these needs in the D.Min. certification. Some professors 
from other departments were skeptical of the celebrity appeal that was 
central to the new degree. The celebrity theologian was to be the lead 
mentor to the students in the program. Should Janzen go forward with 
this program even though he knew its dependence on one celebrity 
made it fragile? The existing D.Min. program was more traditional and 
didn’t bring in enough revenues to keep the seminary in the black. He 
had to be careful with the faculty in that some might view the celebrity 
theologian as a tacky way to make the seminary more attractive. 
Friends’ At a Glance 
Friends’ had been founded in 1891. It conferred the following 
degrees: B.A., B.S., M.A., M.A.T., M.B.A., M.Div., M.Ed., D.Min., 
Ed.D., and Psy.D. It offered majors in more than 35 undergraduate 
majors. It had a 77-acre suburban campus (20 miles from downtown) 
and other sites, the most important of which was the park-like 
metropolitan office building that housed the seminary as well as 
evening adult programs in degree completion, counseling, education, 
and business. Friends’ had 134 full-time faculty. 
Friends’ was based on evangelical Christianity. As a university, 
it was “to demonstrate the meaning of Jesus Christ by offering a caring 
educational community in which each individual may achieve the 
highest intellectual and personal growth and by participating 
responsibly in our world’s concerns” (from university Web site). 
Friends’ was to “liberate the student for a life of purpose and 
fulfillment …”. It maintains a “program of varied activities that directs 
the student to a commitment to Christ as Lord and Savior, encourages 
attitudes of reverence and devotion toward God, leads to recognition 
that the revealed commandments of God are the supreme criteria of the 
good life, enables the student to mirror the example of Christ in human 
relationships, and develops a greater desire to serve humanity in a spirit 
of Christian love.” It promotes activities that emphasize “the 
development of leadership, initiative, and teamwork by giving 
opportunity to make practical use of the skills and ideas acquired 
through academic courses.” Friends’ mission includes a concern for 
social justice, a commitment to peace and nonviolence, and a belief in 
the equality of all people. 
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Though the school was founded by the Friends, only approximately 
nine percent of the undergraduate students are Friends. More than 50 
denominations are represented on campus, and the largest 
denominational choice is Baptist; however, “non-denominational” 
was the category chosen by the largest number of students. Friends’ 
is a Christian community that expects students and employees to abide 
by the university’s community responsibilities and expectations. 
All employees – faculty, administration, and staff – are committed 
evangelical Christians. The students do not have to be Christian, though 
the vast majority of the traditional undergraduates are. However, many 
of the adults in eveningThe graduate programs were 
programs are not. Schools of
used to subsidize the under- divinity in universities can
graduate program that had have people of various faiths, 
become non-viable financially. including non-Christians, but 
this was not true at Friends’. 
Transition from College to University 
The seminary was merged with Friends’ during the period when 
Friends’ made a transition from college to university status. The 
graduate programs were used to subsidize the undergraduate program 
that had become non-viable financially. Graduate programs were 
expected to contribute to the undergraduate deficit or at least break 
even. The seminary had not made money in recent years, but it was 
Janzen’s hope that the LEC program would push it out of the red. 
In 1983, Friends’ had 650 traditional undergraduate students and a 
budget of $5.3 million. To survive financially, the university had moved 
into adult and graduate programs (e.g., degree completion for working 
adults, 1986; doctor of psychology, 1990; master of arts in teaching, 
1992; master of business administration, 1993; master of education, 
1993; Evangelical Seminary, 1996). The M.B.A., counseling, and 
graduate education programs continued to generate large surpluses 
that subsidized the undergraduate college. 
However, the growth in graduate programs coincided with a 
nearly 100% increase in the undergraduate student population in the 
undergraduate college. The college had been written up in news 
magazines as a top ranked regional school. Christian parents saw 
Friends’ as a safe haven for their children that also provided what 
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they perceived as an excellent education. In order to enhance the 
administrative and marketing capacity of the university and better 
serve students, many administrators had been added in marketing, 
recruitment, and retention efforts, thereby driving administrative costs 
higher. Though the undergraduate college charged premium tuition 
prices, it still could not make ends meet. It also used financial aid to 
attract students; it didn’t really collect the premium tuition prices from 
most families, who had average annual incomes under $50,000. 
Other liberal arts colleges depended on income from endowments to 
subsidize their undergrad programs. Friends’ endowment was modest; 
for 2002-2003 it was $15,086,540, only enough to cover four to five 
months of the operating budget. As Bill Duncan, the current president, 
was fond of stating, “We live by our wits.” Friends’ had to be 
entrepreneurial and responsive to its market segments and it could not 
sustain autonomous programs, such as the seminary, that ran perennial 
deficits. 
Undergraduate majors varied in terms of profitability, but Duncan 
saw the undergraduate college as a unit made up of interdependent 
majors that had to be seen holistically. One couldn’t readily eliminate 
expensive majors, such as science or engineering, without decreasing 
the overall image of the undergraduate college. Eliminating the seminary 
would not threaten the institutional identity or existence of the university, 
as it was not perceived as central to the university. The Christian core 
was the undergraduate program. Although the seminary clearly 
contributed to the Christian mission of the university, it was evaluated 
first on its bottom line because it was a graduate program; this was the 
way Friends’ key administrators and board perceived the matter. 
Seminary’s Financial Problems Led To Merger with Friends’ 
The financial difficulties of the seminary preceded Janzen’s arrival. 
It had nearly closed earlier. 
The seminary had always been multi-denominational. It was 
founded in 1947 by the Evangelicals, Quakers (synonymous with 
Friends), and Free Methodists. It was the first in the region to achieve 
dual accreditation by the Association of Theological Schools (1974) and 
the regional association of schools and colleges (1976). 
The key factors leading up to the merger were the desire of Friends’ 
to become a university, which required graduate programs such as those 
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offered by the seminary, and the financial desperation of the seminary. 
L. Samuel Davidson, the president of Evangelical Seminary at the time 
of the merger, was the key facilitator. He had also served as president of 
Friends’ years before, thereby making him familiar with all the key 
decision-makers. 
Davidson came to the seminary on January 2, 1993 with the goal of 
getting the seminary ready to merge with a larger institution. From his 
earlier contacts with the seminary, he was aware of significant financial 
problems. Yet, upon arrival, he was shocked to find that the seminary 
couldn’t even afford to have its garbage removed. The next day bank 
officials demanded immediate payment on a note that was one year in 
arrears. After investigating further, he discovered that the seminary was 
$2.4 million in debt. This debt and the dwindling support from its 
traditional evangelical constituency threatened accreditation from the 
Association of Theological Schools and the regional collegiate 
accreditation body. He struggled to keep the seminary afloat through 
donations, tuition revenues, and grants. He finally managed to make the 
seminary attractive to Friends’. 
Friends’ board and key administrators thought the addition of a 
seminary would justify Friends’ transition from college to university 
status. At a joint meeting of the boards in February 1996, the decision to 
merge on July 1, 1996 was made. This gave the administrators very 
little time to work out all the details. Thus, a college of approximately 
2,000 students absorbed the 300-student seminary and renamed itself a 
university. 
The merger process was not easy, but Friends’ balance sheet 
improved (see Table 1). The contribution of assets at the time of the 
merger made the decision to merge a “no-brainer” in the eyes of the 
CPA accounting and finance professor who had an extensive outside 
practice and was experienced at business valuation. The accredited 
seminary programs were worth a great deal as well even though they 
didn’t figure in the balance sheet. The most visible asset of the seminary 
was its building, which proved ideal for evening adult programs 
servicing the metropolitan area and beyond. 
Post-Merger Era under Dean Janzen 
Janzen knew he had to address both the external community to build 
interest in seminary programs as well as maintain positive relations with 
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Table 1
 
Summary of Impact of Merger on Friends’ (July 1, 1996)
 
Pre-Merger 
Friends’ 
Pre-Merger 
Seminary 
Post-Merger 
Friends’ 
Assets $43,289,181 $7,771,899 $51,061,080 
Liabilities $11,844,766 $4,048,683 $15,893,459 
Net Assets $31,444,405 $3,723,216 $35,167,621 
Friends’ administrators so they wouldn’t be too draconian in their 
demands that the seminary always cover its expenses. He knew he had 
to get the seminary close to breaking even but he also could promote 
several features of the seminary to the university administration: 
• The seminary had a stronger minority enrollment than other parts 
of the university. The undergraduate program was based in a small 
town, 25 miles from the greater metropolitan area, which was not 
perceived as attractive for African-American students. 
• The Mexican-Americans who lived close to the rural campus often 
chose not to attend higher education. Hence, the undergraduate college 
was overwhelmingly white. This was a concern for the board of 
directors, which had directed the Friends’ administrators to work on 
increasing minority enrollment. 
• The seminary also led the university in the adoption of Web-based 
teaching and the use of smart classrooms. Such classrooms had built-in 
computers, overhead projection devices, and ceiling-mounted 
projectors. The system developed by the seminary became a model for 
Friends’ new construction at the undergraduate campus. 
• Janzen had started a guest lecture series to serve local churches by 
bringing in famous speakers. The first several events were very well 
attended. 
Janzen wanted to be innovative as well as maintain the existing 
successful programs. He thought a positive attribute of the LEC 
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program was its celebrity appeal in that a charismatic theologian was to 
be contracted to give some of the courses and serve as lead online 
mentor to the students. He also knew that this dependence on one 
celebrity would be perceived as a weakness in that the program could 
be done irreparable harm should the celebrity theologian become 
unavailable to Friends’ due to illness or a falling out between the 
university and the celebrity theologian. 
Traditional Protestant denomination churches suffer poor 
attendance. On the other hand, megachurches are popular because of 
charismatic leadership and programs that address the psychological, 
spiritual, and social support needs of congregants. These churches are 
referred to as spirit-filled. They are vibrant and exciting as opposed to 
the reserved reverence of traditional church. They offer a wide range of 
programs to serve people, including small groups that give people a 
feeling of social support, entertaining worship meetings that include 
professional musicians, and so forth. Janzen thought the seminary 
would have to be responsive to this movement toward spirit-filled 
communities of faith such as the megachurches. He knew the seminary 
could not count on ties to a specific denomination like many other 
seminaries that trained pastors for that denomination. The Friends didn’t 
require that their pastors have a master of divinity, though many of 
those serving programmed meetings (i.e., services led by pastors that 
appeared much like other Protestant worship services) had formal 
divinity training. Unprogrammed Friends meetings did not depend on 
pastoral leadership. Furthermore, some of the non-denominational 
groups in the area did not require formal training for their pastors. 
Janzen knew he could not count on denominational support. He hoped 
programs like the LEC would alleviate the financial deficits of the 
seminary. 
Managing the Tension between Mission and the Bottom Line 
During the ’90s growth years, a campus culture had developed at 
Friends’ whereby financial concerns drove the evaluation of new 
programs. Mission-driven programs typically didn’t get beyond faculty 
review unless they could show self-sufficiency within a three-year 
period. President Duncan appreciated this concern for fiscal discipline. 
He had worked at four other small Christian colleges before coming to 
Friends’ and viewed the opportunity at Friends’ as his last chance to 
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serve as a university president before retirement. He was familiar with 
the competitive landscape of Christian undergraduate education. 
Duncan was concerned about the seminary’s competition in that it 
competed with another seminary that was also losing money. However, 
the other seminary had a wealthy donor who enabled it to continue and 
even to expand; it had opened a branch in northern California. 
The transition from an undergraduate college (focused exclusively 
on Christian education) to a larger institution with elements that were 
clearly “profit” centers (i.e., excess revenues in not-for-profit 
accounting), such as the early degree completion program (it had begun 
struggling financially of late), counseling, and graduate business and 
education, created strains on the existing structure. For example, 
Friends’ administrators and board continued to be focused on 
undergraduate education in their meetings yet understood that the 
graduate programs existed and were bringing in money, nearly 30% of 
the total (see Table 2). 
This transition to a complex university occurred over more than a 
decade, beginning in 1986. The organizational structure changed, the 
accounting and administrative systems expanded, enrollment grew 
dramatically, and so forth. However, the mission and strategy of the 
organization did not change from the prior emphasis on undergraduate 
Christian education. 
Table 2 
Undergraduate and Graduate Revenues 
Academic Year Program Total Percentage 
FY 02-03 Undergrad $25,978,391 71% 
Actual Grad $10,558,623 29% 
Total $36,537,014 
FY 03-04 Undergrad $28,512,752 72% 
Actual Grad $11,255,127 28% 
Total $39,767,879 
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Should Janzen Push for the Adoption of the LEC Program? 
Janzen knew the seminary’s accomplishments were extensive. 
However, Janzen also understood he had to bring the seminary’s 
finances close to balance. The seminary needed a cash cow quickly. 
It could not charge more and attract students in the master’s programs. 
Should the seminary expand its existing doctor of ministry program 
(D.Min.) to include an LEC track? What Janzen and the seminary 
faculty were looking into was a D.Min. track focused on serving the 
needs of what they called “emerging culture,” a Postmodern culture 
less defined by traditional denominations. In the Postmodern era, the 
“emerging culture” longed for a spirit-filled church that would meet 
their religious, psychological, and social support needs. 
Janzen understood that the board and administrators were focused 
on the undergraduate college, which could run deficits. He accepted that 
the seminary, which also served the Christian mission, would need to 
come close to breaking even and could not continue to run large deficits. 
Janzen also was concerned about the sense of mission felt by the 
faculty. How could he get them to see beyond meeting budget targets; 
satisfying teaching loads; surviving the retention, tenure, and promotion 
process; and other such practical details? He knew that theologians had 
spent their careers studying the Christian worldview, which is 
transcendent, going beyond life’s more banal activities. Such people are 
responsive to the notion that they are part of a cause, an evangelical 
movement. Janzen thought the LEC program would build excitement 
which would protect them from being preoccupied with their routines so 
that they could be motivated by the transcendent. He was concerned that 
faculty had become too comfortable teaching, writing, and serving on 
committees – too inward-looking. He wanted to promote outreach and 
continuing education seminars to promote the seminary. He thought the 
LEC program would complement the outreach approach. 
Janzen worried that the seminary faculty too readily indulged 
themselves in self-pity about the merger. He thought success with the 
LEC program would help them put this behind them. Janzen felt like 
telling the faculty to “get over it,” but he hadn’t experienced the 
messiness of the merger. He knew that he had to help build excitement, 
which he thought might be possible through the LEC program. Also, he 
worried that the administration would keep harping at the seminary and 
making veiled closure threats if the deficits weren’t corrected. 
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He had to present the seminary in a positive light to university 
administrators to influence their perceptions. He hoped the LEC 
program would help administrators focus on what the seminary was 
doing to promote the mission of the university rather than continually 
be preoccupied with losses. 
Janzen reflected on how the LEC program would mirror the 
university’s values. It was to demonstrate the meaning of Jesus Christ 
by offering a learning community that would participate responsibly in 
the world’s concerns. He saw it as providing pastors a chance to renew 
themselves for a life of purpose and fulfillment to serve humanity in a 
spirit of Christian love. Central to the program was the development of 
leadership, initiative, and teamwork by giving opportunity to make 
practical use of the skills and ideas acquired through the LEC program. 
Janzen understood how such leaders would more likely find a home in 
the non-denominational and evangelical churches, rather than the staid 
and dying churches linked to conventional Protestant denominations. 
Janzen felt a sense of urgency about ministering to the needs of people 
who couldn’t find a home in the conventional churches. He thought the 
path revealed to him through his analysis and prayers was the LEC 
program. 
He wondered how he could present the LEC program to the faculty 
and the administration so that they would approve it. He couldn’t rely 
exclusively on the Christian focus of the seminary and its programs as 
the administrators applied a different standard (i.e., the bottom line) to 
the seminary than the undergraduate college, which lost a great deal of 
money each year. How could he present the seminary in a positive light 
in terms of its contributions and show how the LEC program would 
build on what he perceived as a positive path? Would it resolve the 
financial bottom line problem of the seminary? 
Janzen also knew President Duncan was concerned about whether 
or not to pull the plug on the seminary. President Duncan had said 
publicly that he thought there was not enough demand in the area for 
two seminaries; he saw the competitive landscape as unpromising. 
Janzen was hoping the national draw of the proposed LEC program 
would reframe this argument of too many seminaries for the area from 
a local frame to a national one. 
It was unlikely that the program would foster much in terms of loss 
as existing faculty were used and the celebrity theologian’s contract 
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could be made contingent on satisfactory enrollment or cancelled after 
the first year. 
Duncan was willing to support the new program; he didn’t think it 
could do any harm to the university’s image in that it was perceived 
locally as an entrepreneurial university. The university would 
periodically borrow money against its endowment. It had done so 
previously with the failed launch of its online effort and lost hundreds 
of thousands of dollars. To Duncan it came down to the following: risk 
a few hundred thousand dollars to launch the LEC program or close the 
seminary. Duncan had been through enough start-up programs to know 
that early budgets were simply estimates. He thought several hundred 
thousand dollars was a likely short-term cost before the program began 
to pay off. 
It was late and Janzen had to prepare his Powerpoint presentation 
for the full faculty. How should he present the LEC program to get 
buy-in from faculty and administrators? 
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